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Abstract
This paper provides new empirical evidence on the timing and sensitivity of fiscal
policy over the business cycle in Germany. Employing structural vector autore-
gressions with time-varying transmission parameters, we find that the responsive-
ness of the fiscal balance to output gap shocks varied substantially over the last
decades. Combining output gap and fiscal balance reactions reveals three distinct
fiscal regimes that gradually flow into each other. Increasing countercyclical reac-
tions can be observed in the 1970s. This is followed by almost two decades of de-
creasing short-term but increasing medium-term countercylicality. A third regime
is characterized by further decreases of the short-term countercyclicality, while fis-
cal policy turns acyclical in the medium-term perspective. Additional analyses
show, that especially changes in the degree of trade openness and the employment
ratio, along with the adoption of stronger inflation targeting have driven the de-
cline of the sensitivity of German public finances.
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1 Introduction
A central idea in recent macroeconomic theory is that a countercyclical fiscal policy
helps to smoothen the business cycle and to increase economic growth.1 Along these
lines, some authors have shown that countercyclical fiscal policy can improve welfare
(see, for example, Kliem and Kriwoluzky, 2014). However, Hagen (1948) long ago
stressed that the timing of fiscal policy is a crucial factor for these desirable effects.
Measures implemented too late, even though the current economic situation has been
assessed correctly, may lead to yet further destabilization and therefore negative effects
on welfare. Only if the reaction of fiscal policy is countercyclical, it has the potential to
smoothen the business cycle.2
Several studies have analyzed the question of the cyclicality of fiscal policy from
an empirical perspective. Ballasone, Francese and Zotteri (2010) identify a procyclical
pattern of fiscal policy for an EU 14 aggregate based on annual data from 1970-2004.
This is also supported by Ballassone and Francese (2004), who find a procyclical pat-
tern of overall fiscal policy in the EU, the US and Japan for annual data from 1970-2000.
In contrast, Golinelli and Momigliano (2006) find a countercyclical timing of fiscal pol-
icy for an EMU 11 aggregate based on an annual real-time data (1988-2006). Studies
like Gavin and Perotti (1997), on the other hand, argue on the basis of annual data
(1968-1995) that overall fiscal policy has been generally countercyclical in developed
countries and more procyclical in developing countries. This is further supported by
Talvi and Vegh (2005), who argue that the strong procyclicality of fiscal policy in de-
veloping countries is caused by a higher volatility of the tax bases.3
One reason for the strongly differing findings in the literature might be that the fis-
cal policy reaction is not static. It may evolve over several periods and it may change
its pattern over time. Therefore it is called for an analysis based on a dynamic and
time-varying framework. Muscatelli, Tirelli and Trecroci (2002) and Aghion and Mari-
nescu (2008) analyze the responsiveness of public finances to fluctuations in economic
activity from such a time-varying perspective. Muscatelli et al. (2002) apply sub-
sample analyses for Germany (among others) and point to a response pattern that
has changed over time towards an acyclical reaction between 1971-1998. However,
the applied abrupt regime changes approach may not capture the whole dimension of
time variation in case of changes that occur more gradually. Aghion and Marinescu
(2008) allow for more gradual time variation between 1970-2005 and find an increasing
1Priesmeier and Staehler (2011) present a detailed survey of the literature discussing the effects of
smoothing business cycles on economic growth. See as well the discussion in Fatás and Mihov (2001).
2See, for example, Alesina and Perotti (1995) or Eslava (2011) for a more detailed account of the politi-
cal economic transmission mechanisms. Chapter 5 of IMF (2008) presents a comprehensive overview on
stabilization measures. Dolls et al. (2015) analyze the effectiveness of fiscal policy in euro area Member
States under the current fiscal surveillance framework.
3There is a wide range of studies which focus on only one of the two sub-aggregates of overall fiscal
policy: the “automatic reaction” of the budget deficit via the working of automatic stabilizers (see, for
example, Debrun and Kapoor, 2010, or, Leigh and Stehn, 2009) and the discretionary fiscal policy chan-
nel, where the most common approach to identifying discretionary measures is “cyclical adjustment”
(see, for example, Alesina and Perotti, 1995).
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degree of countercyclicality in the US and the UK, whereas for an EMU 15 aggregate
the counterycyclicylity is decreasing since the 1980s.4 However, their static time series
framework does not capture the possible dynamics of the interaction between fiscal
balance and economic activity over several periods and Germany is not included as a
single country in the analysis.
Against this background we present an in-depth analysis of the timing of fiscal pol-
icy over the business cycle in Germany that takes into account the possible dynamics
and time variation. We particularly focus on the following questions:
1. What can we say about the sensitivity and the dynamics of the fiscal policy reac-
tion to fluctuations in economic activity in Germany?
2. Do we observe a stable cyclical reaction pattern or has it changed over time - can
we identify different regimes of cyclicality?
3. What economic forces cause changes in the fiscal reaction to economic shocks?
One aim of this study is to identify broad regimes of reaction patterns over a long-
term horizon. In order to avoid that the results are distorted by the exceptional crisis
years 2009-2010, we focus on a pre-crisis sample from 1970-2008. Our empirical analy-
ses are based on structural vector autoregressions (SVAR). This enables us to take into
account the endogeneity of fiscal policy and the business cycle as well as the dynamic
character of the variables. To allow for possible time variation, we use a state space
model with time-varying parameters that allows the coefficients to evolve gradually
over time.5
The paper contributes to the literature in the following four ways. First, by em-
ploying quarterly data we derive insights on the sub-annual reaction of fiscal policy to
fluctuations in economic activity. Second, we analyze the dynamic reaction pattern and
sensitivity of the fiscal balance to output gap shocks and thereby study the cyclicality
of fiscal policy. Third, using time-varying parameters enables us to investigate the pos-
sibility of changing cyclicality regimes over the sample horizon. And fourth, we study
the driving forces of time variation in the fiscal policy reaction.
The paper is organized as follows. Section two briefly introduces our concept of the
cyclicality of fiscal policy and presents the data employed. In section three we study
the timing of fiscal policy based on time-invariant models that account for discrete
regime changes. Time-varying structural analyses are performed in section four. Sec-
tion five provides evidence on the driving forces of time variation in Germany. Section
six concludes.
4Such evolvement has implications on the assessment of structural fiscal indicators – measures de-
rived from constant parameter models tend to be biased, i.e. tend to be too high for the European case.
5A wide range of alternative specifications can be found in the time variation literature, including
Markov-switching VARs (Paap and van Dijk, 2003, or Sims and Zha, 2006) and other regime-switching
VARs (Koop and Potter, 2006). TVP VARs have recently become the most prominent tools in fiscal
policy analyses (see e.g. Cimadomo, 2012, Cimadomo and D’Agostino, 2015, or Eickmeier, Lemke and
Marcellino, 2015).
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2 Cyclicality of fiscal policy and data
Generally, fiscal policy can be unrelated with the cycle (acyclical) or respond in a pro-
or countercyclical way to economic developments. To assess the relationship of fis-
cal policy and the business cycle, a measure of the business cycle, a measure of the
fiscal policy stance, and, finally, a definition of the acyclicality, countercyclicality and
procyclicality of fiscal policies is required.
In this paper we follow broad majority of empirical studies which use the real out-
put gap as an indicator for the business cycle (see Golinelli and Momigliano, 2009, or
OECD, 2010)6, as it divides economic development into phases in which output is be-
low potential output (output gap smaller than zero), phases in which output is above
potential output (output gap larger than zero), and phases in which the output equals
potential output. This gives a clear-cut picture of “good” and “bad” economic times,
while other measures – such as GDP growth rates – make additional and arbitrary
definitions necessary. For the output gap variable, we have calculated the real GDP
gap based on the quarterly national accounts database of the Deutsche Bundesbank.
Nominal GDP was first realized by the chain-linked GDP deflator and then seasonally
adjusted. In a second step, we applied the Hodrick-Prescott filter (Lambda=1600) to
the real GDP series, which we prolonged with its own linear trend in the past (1960-
1970) and the future (2009-2019) in order to avoid a distortion of the results at the lower
and upper bounds of our series.7 The real output gap was then calculated as the dif-
ference between actual real GDP and potential real GDP (measured by the HP-filtered
trend) as a percentage of potential GDP.8
The most common indicator for the fiscal stance is the general government balance.
In this paper we refer to the primary balance, because we analyze fiscal policy reac-
tions to the business cycle and interest payments do neither react strongly to the cycle
nor can they be changed easily by the government (see for support of this approach,
Mélitz, 2000, Muscatelli et al., 2002, and Perotti, 2005).9 We subtracted general govern-
ment expenditures (excluding interest) according to the national accounts definition
from general government revenues (mostly taxes and social security contributions)
and divided the results by real trend GDP. Both, the expenditure and the revenue se-
ries are first realized with the chain-linked GDP deflator and then adjusted seasonally.
As we want to analyze overall fiscal policy, we chose the cyclically unadjusted primary
balance (which is influenced by automatic stabilizers and by discretionary fiscal policy
measures) as indicator.
Concerning the relationship of the economic cycle and fiscal policy, the literature
6Some studies refer to the growth rate of output. See, for example, Lane (2003).
7Alternatively, we applied a one-sided Hodrick-Prescott filter, which did not affect our results sub-
stantially.
8This measure corresponds to the difference between log actual and log potential output, used, for
example, by Muscatelli et al. (2002).
9Using primary balances is not uncontested (see, for example, Blanchard and Perotti, 2002, or Go-
linelli and Momigliano, 2009). However, it should be noted that the general timing pattern of fiscal
policy over the business cycle is only slightly affected by interest spending, as we obtained very similar
results using total deficits.
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provides different approaches to defining cyclicality in practice. Related to standard
Keynesian approaches as well as the theory of tax smoothing (see Barro, 1979), it seems
straightforward to use the output gap and the primary balance in levels as it is done e.g.
in Muscatelli et al. (2002) and Aghion andMarinescu (2008).10 Then a positive primary
balance (equalling a fiscal surplus) at the time of a positive output gap the fiscal stance
can be expected to contribute to smoothing the business cycle and is therefore called
“countercyclical”. For the case of a negative output gap, a countercylical fiscal policy
would demand negative primary balances (deficits). Fiscal policy would be termed
“acyclical” if the primary balance is zero despite an output gap different from zero
or if the output gap is zero but the primary balance differs from zero. In this paper
we follow this dominating approach, as it establishes a straightforward, clear-cut and
theory-based link between the state of the business cycle and fiscal policy.
Figure 1 shows the development of the real GDP gap (black line) and the govern-
ment fiscal stance as the primary balance ratio (blue line).11 We can already see that the
two stationary series seem to move very closely together in some periods, while they
diverge strongly during others. This may be taken as initial evidence for time-variation
in the data.
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Figure 1: Output gap and fiscal stance (seasonally adjusted), 1970Q1-2008Q4
3 Benchmark results and time variation
Our aim is to analyze the timing of fiscal policy over the business cycle - an attempt
which is directly affected by the importance of the dynamic reactions of the variables
and the endogeneity of fiscal policy and the business cycle. These two aspects can be
tackled in an intuitive way by employing vector autoregressions (VARs) and by assess-
ing the the structural relations between the business cycle and fiscal policy, tracing the
effects of exogenous and unanticipated shocks in economic activity.
10Alternative approaches rely either on the change of the primary balance (see e.g. Alesina et al., 2008)
or on changes of both variables, the output gap and the primary balance (see, for example, Lane, 2003,
or Leigh and Stehn, 2009).
11All level variables are adjusted for German reunification.
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To identify these shocks, we use a B–model approach where the residuals are or-
thogonalized based on a Cholesky-type decomposition of the variance-covariance ma-
trix (Sims, 1980).12 This implies a recursive structure of the economy determined by
the ordering of the variables. In our case the output gap is put first and thus the fiscal
stance reacts contemporaneously to the output shock, whereas there is no feedback re-
action running from the structural primary balance to the output gap within the quar-
ter the output gap shock occurs. Decisive for this ordering is that we are analyzing
especially on the reaction of the fiscal stance to economic shocks and not so much the
reaction of the economy to fiscal shocks.13 However, we also changed the order of the
variables in sensitivity analyses. Apart from the expected changes in the contempora-
neous reactions, this did not have large impacts on the overall course.
3.1 Structural analyses based on time-invariant SVARs
As a benchmark for all following analyses, we start our investigation with a time-
invariant two-dimensional VARof order twowith a constant. Multivariate least-squares
(LS) are used to obtain time-invariant values for the coefficients. The optimal lag order
is set according to the Schwartz information criteria (SC), autocorrelation analysis and
with respect to the fact that the time-invariant VARs will be taken as a reference for
the time-varying parameter models that may be overparameterized in case of high lag
orders. To analyze the impact of the identified output gap shock on fiscal policy over
longer horizons, we compute impulse response functions, which can be interpreted as
forward-looking budgetary reaction functions over a horizon of 20 periods (5 years).
Figure 2 (continuous line with quads) shows the corresponding impulse response
functions (within 95% confidence intervals - dashed lines) of the output gap itself and
of the overall fiscal stance following a positive 1 pp shock in the output gap.14
The left panel of figure 2 shows the reaction of the output gap to a shock in itself.
Here, the one-off shock leads in the first period after the shock to a further widening
of the output gap before the output gap starts to close in the second period.15 After six
quarters the output gap is no longer significantly different from zero. The point esti-
mate decreases further until the reaction becomes slightly but insignificantly negative
12Structural shocks and the identification scheme are assumed to be time-invariant over the sample.
With respect to the estimated residuals of the constant parameter VAR and measurement residuals of
the time-varying parameter model, this seems to be a reasonable specification because the structure of
the residuals does not change over time and we are using real economic data.
13The reverse approach of modeling of a contemporaneous reaction of the economy to fiscal policy
shocks would make sense especially within an analysis of fiscal stimuli on the economy. However, in
this case the fiscal variable included should only take discretionary fiscal policy shocks (and not as well
automatic stabilizers) into account. Furthermore, a contemporaneous reaction significantly different
from zero in the balance due to fast automatic stabilization seems to be more intuitive than a significant
reaction of the economy to fiscal shocks within the same quarter.
14Continuous and dotted lines are related to the benchmark model including identified exogenous
regime changes (see 3.2). There are no significant differences between the impulse responses.
15The “overshooting” of the output gap in the first period after the shock indicates that GDP growth
rates exceed trend GDP growth rates before the growth rate of actual GDP starts to fall below the trend
growth rate between periods one and two and the positive gap thus slowly begins to close.
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Figure 2: Impulse responses of time-invariant SVAR and SVAR with disrete regimes
from quarter ten on, where actual output falls below trend output.16 Afterwards, the
system tends to its equilibrium where actual output equals trend output again.
The primary balance (right panel of figure 2) reacts immediately and significantly
positively to the output gap shock with a contemporaneous increase of 0.22 percentage
points. As discretionary fiscal policy is rarely able to react within the same quarter to
output gap shocks, this reaction can be interpreted as the isolatedworking of automatic
stabilizers.17 Thereafter, the fiscal stance reaction increases further to the maximum of
around 0.50 percentage points in the first and the second quarter. Combining these fis-
cal stance reactions with the output gap reactions would - in terms of deficit elasticity
- equal values of 0.22 in the contemporaneous and 0.40 in the first and second quarter
after a shock. Afterwards, the effect on the stance decreases and is no longer signifi-
cantly different from zero between quarters three and four. Around quarter seven, the
effect on the fiscal stance even starts to turn significantly negative. The highest nega-
tive effect is reached with -0.44 percentage points in period nine. From then onwards,
the negative effect starts to fade out - parallel to the adjustment of output to the new
equilibrium level.
To evaluate the timing of fiscal policy now, we have to bring together the develop-
ment of the output gap and of the fiscal stance. According to our definition in section 2,
fiscal policy is clearly countercyclical in the first three quarters as significant surpluses
are accompanied by positive output gaps. Between quarter five to nine, we observe
a significant negative effect on the fiscal stance after quarter six, although the output
gap is no longer significantly different from zero. This reflects acyclical fiscal policy.
16It is not uncommon for the economy to go through such a period of underutilization before the new
equilibrium level is reached. This might result from expectation or inventory adjustment effects.
17In general the primary balance captures the automatic stabilization and, if there may be systematic
discretionary policy measures, this share of discretionary policy too. However, in Germany, where the
parliament needs to be involved in the decision-making process for discretionary measures, decision
and implementation lags are very likely, and thus the probability of systematic discretionary policy
reactions that occur in the same quarter of the shock is very low (Leigh and Stehn, 2009). In subsequent
horizons, systematic discretionary policy measures, can be as well part of the reaction. The fiscal shocks
capture all non-systematic policies, i.e. only the non-systematic discretionary measures.
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Taken together, the benchmark model indicates the fiscal policy reaction to be strongly
countercyclical at first and then to become acyclical in the second year after a shock.18
3.2 Time variation: discrete regime changes and gradually evolving
fiscal policy
As we consider a rather long sample horizon from 1970 to 2008, the reactions of the
fiscal balance to output gap shocks might have changed over time. In such cases
a constant parameter model would be inappropriate. For instance, variations could
result from changes in how the fiscal balance reacts to economic changes (e.g. be-
cause of structural changes in the tax system or in monetary policy) or, alternatively,
from changes in the structure of the economy itself and the way in which it reacts to
economic shocks. In general, structural changes can occur abruptly and time point-
specifically, for example, due to abrupt and far-reaching economic or political changes.
Or they can evolve gradually, for example, if the structure of the public sector and e.g.
social security changes over time or economic agents adjust only slowly.
We test for such specifications of time variation in the benchmark model using con-
ventional Chow-type tests and recursive least squares coefficients.19 Bootstrapped p-
values from 1974Q3 to 2004Q4 are plotted in figure 3 (in the first row). Both tests
indicate significant instability for the benchmark model especially in the seventies. In
addition, we tested whether abrupt regime changes can explain the discovered time
variation. Therefore, we implemented a wide range of exogenously identified struc-
tural breaks and re-tested the benchmark models.20 First, we tested the hypothesis
of a partisan regime shift in 1982Q4 when the conservative-liberal government came
into power and lasted until 1998Q4. This is not significant. In a second step two dif-
ferent post second oil crisis regimes – each of them with two different starting points
in 1980Q1 and 1982Q4 - are tested: the first assuming one regime for the remaining
sample horizon, the second assuming the same regime to last only until the fall of the
Berlin Wall (1989Q4). On a 10 percent level, only the post second oil crisis regimes,
which start in 1980Q1 and lasts until reunification, is estimated to lead to marginal
but significantly smaller output gaps (-0.002). When implementing this “oil crisis to
reunification regime” and the transitory oil crisis dynamics, only the corresponding
break-point tests shown in the second row of figure 3 now reject the null hypothesis of
18The feedback effects of the fiscal stance on the output gap (not shown in the figures above) are
clearly insignificant and rather non-Keynesian, as the impact of increasing surpluses on the output gap
is indicated to be positive. However, this finding is well in line with existing VAR studies for the German
case (see, for example, Muscatelli et al., 2002).
19We use bootstrap versions of the Chow break-point test (BP) and sample-split test (SS) according to
Candelon and Lütkepohl (2001). Testing is based on a minimum of 16 observations in the sub-samples
at the end and the beginning. The slight evidence for instability at the end of the test sample has to be
regarded cautiously due to the small number of observations.
20In all versions we included significant impulse dummies in 1979Q2 and 1982Q3 to capture the mas-
sive transitory effects on public finances and the output gap related to the second oil crisis. Alternatively,
we implemented different regimes for the time between the two oil crises using shifts (1975-1982, 1977-
1980, 1979-1982 and 1980-1982). None of them proved significant.
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Figure 3: Results of break-point and sample-split tests
instable parameters. Nevertheless, the sample split tests still indicate some instability
at the beginning of the sample. Thus, allowing for discrete parameter changes may not
capture the full range of time variation found in the German data.
Instead, changes may occur more gradually, which is indicated by Chow-type tests
on smaller sub-samples and recursive least squares estimates which provide evidence
for significant gradual evolvement of the parameters, in particular, within the first
decade (1970 to 1980) and around the time of German reunification in 1990/1991.
Therefore, we will adopt a more general model that allows for such evolvement of
parameters in the next section.
4 A time-varying parameter (TVP) VAR approach
The presented evidence for parameter instability in time-invariant models speaks in
favour of time-varying reaction schemes. To capture this in a adequate way we need
a more general, time-varying parameter (TVP) model that allows the coefficients - and
thus the corresponding impulse responses - to evolve gradually over time.21 An intu-
itive framework to illustrate such time-varying relations between economic variables
is a state space model where the reduced-form coefficients - the states – are allowed to
21A wide range of alternative specifications have been suggested in the time variation literature, in-
cludingMarkov-switching VARs (e.g. Paap and vanDijk, 2003, or Sims and Zha, 2006) and other regime-
switching VARs (Koop and Potter, 2006). However, TVP VARs have become the most prominent tools in
recent applied analyses of fiscal policy issues (see, for example, Kirchner, Cimadomo and Hauptmeier,
2010).
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evolve according to a stochastic process, represented by a state equation or a law of mo-
tion. Given this, the states can be calculated recursively frommeasurable data based on
a certain time-varying data-generating process, represented by a measurement equation
- in our case a TVP VAR.
According to our research question on the responsiveness of fiscal policy, time vari-
ation is introduced in a way that allows the systematic policy propagation parameters
- but not the structure of the measurement error variances covariances - to potentially
evolve over time as observations are added, i.e. our analyses are based on a homoscedas-
tic state space model. We apply a fairly parsimonious two-dimensional TVP VAR of
order two including an intercept as linear measurement equation.22 For each observa-
tion t this equation is written below in time-dependent, stacked and vectorized form,
yt = Ztβt + εt, t = 1, ..., T. (1)
The 2 × 1 vector yt contains the observations for output gap and primary sur-
plus, and εt the independent measurement errors that follow a zero-mean, normally
distributed process with time-invariant residual variance covariance matrix H. The col-
umn vector βt contains the ten states. The regressor matrix Zt is not restricted and only
contains a time-varying constant as an exogenous explanatory variable. It is of dimen-
sion 2 × 10. Our sample size is T = 154 observations excluding p = 2 two presample
values.
According to our economic hypothesis, which postulates that changes in system-
atic structure of the fiscal stance reaction or the reaction of the economy usually occur
slowly and over certain periods (persistent regimes), the law of motion for the param-
eters is given by a vector random walk process.23 This setting ensures highly persistent
and stochastically trended policy propagation parameters, i.e. it is able to capture the
gradual evolvement of regimes.24 Moreover, random walks are typically well-suited
to forecasting macroeconomic time series. Our linear state equation is
βt = βt−1 + ηt, t = 1, ..., T, (2)
where ηt is the independent, zero-mean and normal 10 × 1 vector of state residuals
that has a diagonal time-invariant 10 × 10 variance covariance matrix, Q.25
We estimate this normal, linear and homoscedastic state space model by classical meth-
ods, i.e. by Maximum Likelihood (ML) using Kalman filtering (KF) recursions.26 To
22Hence, the number of variables is n = 2, the number of lags p = 2 and the number of states is
m = n + pn2 = 10.
23See, for example, Kirchner et al., 2010, or Eickmeier, Lemke and Marcellino, 2011 and 2015.
24Gradual evolvement, or in other words, low fluctuations of a state given a certain level requires
rather tight variances of the state residuals var (ηt). For large values the states start to move a lot from
period to period which is rather unrealistic concerning fiscal policy reactions.
25E (εt) = 0, E
(
εtε
′
t
)
= H, E (εtε′s) = 0, for all s 6= t and E (ηt) = 0, E
(
ηtη
′
t
)
= Q, E (ηtη′s) = 0, for
all s 6= t, and E (εtη′s) = 0 holds.
26According to Eickmeier et al. (2015), this is feasible and straightforward for our case, as we refer to
“a model representation that allows equation-by-equation estimation, where each equation with time-
varying parameters is represented as a linear state space model.”
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start the recursions, initial state values are required. Based on the defined Gaussian
system, the initial state vector is normally distributed with expected value b0 and vari-
ance covariance matrix P0, β0 ∼ N (b0, P0). The choice of initial moments leaves some
degrees of freedom to us, while this information may have significant impacts on the
outcome. In general, different solutions to this initialization problem exist. In this pa-
per, we refer to an initialization based on LS estimates for a time-invariant VAR of the
same order (see, for example, Eickmeier et al., 2015). For a “training sample” (TS) of the
initial 20 quarters of our sample horizon the expected state value and the covariance
matrix – which is multiplied by factor four to make it more diffuse – are b0 = βˆ
LSTS
and P0 = 4σˆ
2
βLSTS
.27
Finally, the degree of time variation needs to be defined. The general pattern of
the evolvement was set according to a random walk process with diagonal residual
covariance matrix Q. The variances on the main diagonal of this matrix determine
the range of the residual fluctuations and thus the possible flutuation possible from
a state value to the next periods state value, i.e. the degree of potentially captured
time variation. They are the key leverage in time-varying analyses (see also the dis-
cussion in Eickmeier et al., 2015). In general, two different strategies are possible to
specify Q. First, it can be estimated in a comprehensive estimation approach (results
are presented in appendix A). And second, it can be set according to a priori informa-
tion that is available. The first approach is frequently related to heavy problems with
overparametrization and instability of the estimated TVP VARs (so it is for our case).28
Therefore, we decided to reduce the parameter space by the exogenous choice of Q. Re-
lated to the choice of Q, there is a significant trade-off between simply fitting the data
and the degree of economic structure potentially captured in the estimation, which
speaks in favor of rather conservative choices.29 Also, with respect to our hypothesis
of only gradual evolvement, we implement relatively small values for the variances
on the main diagonal, which is common in the literature. Setting Q = I1010
−9, we al-
low for the same degree of time variation across all states, while the variances are very
close to the ones generated in the constant parameter case and close to the ones of the
27Sensitivity is checked by less restrictive non-informative initial values using a zero-mean and very
large variances as benchmark, b0 = 0, P0 = I10 · 10
5. No significant differences arise. Only for the initial-
ization postulated by Doan, Litterman and Sims (1984) with a set of predefined specification parameters
the results differ. This is not surprising given the restrictive (zero/one) constraints on the initial state
vector and the restrictive degree of time variation captured in the covariance matrix of the states.
28The probability to estimate state coefficients larger than one, or, alternatively, eigenvalues of the
companion matrices that lie outside the unit-circle increases seriously for large values of the covariance
matrix. An effective strategy to counter this problem in the comprehensive approach is to include a
stationarity correction algorithm within the ML procedure while using a tight initialization (e.g. LS-
based). However, for our case, this leads to stationary, but still very fluctuating responses, which stands
in contrast to our hypothesis.
29The larger the state residual variances are, the better the data fit is, as the size of the measurement
residuals decreases. However, the smaller the measurement residuals are, the lower is the degree of
economic structure potentially captured in the model. Conversely, for smaller settings the time-varying
models get closer to the constant parameter case. And for all elements equal to zero, the TVP model
reduces to the constant case.
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frequently applied approach of Doan, Litterman and Sims (1984).30 This specification
enables us to estimate stable TVP VARs that allow for gradual evolvement of fiscal
policy regimes.
4.1 Structural analyses based on time-varying SVARs
The maximum likelihood parameter estimates of the state space model introduced in
the last section indicate significant gradual evolvement of the ten reduced-form states
over the sample horizon after a stabilizing period at the beginning (see figure 4 for the
estimates in two-standard deviation bounds).
To analyze the dynamic impacts of output gap shocks on the fiscal stance, we rely
again on forward-looking fiscal policy reaction functions. In contrast to section 3, these
systematic reaction functions can now evolve gradually over time in their sensitiv-
ity and pattern, except for the contemporaneous period, because the estimated mea-
surement residual covariance matrix is homoscedastic. We implement the same time-
invariant B-model identification scheme as introduced for the constant parameter case
in order to identify output gap shocks. Non-parametric bootstrapping (1,000 itera-
tions) is used to compute median impulse responses at each point of time.
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Figure 4: Estimated states +/- two standard deviations
Time varying reactions of the business cycle and the fiscal stance
How does the time variation of the output gap and fiscal stance reaction to shocks in
economic activity look like? For a forecast horizon of 20 quarters (five years), figures
5a and 5c show the effect of a 1 percentage point (pp) output gap innovation on the real
output gap and the real primary balance from a three-dimensional perspective over the
sample horizon 1971Q4–2008Q4 after a stabilizing period - including the initialization
30See, for example,Muscatelli, Spinelli and Trecroci (2007) or, for a fiscal policy application,Muscatelli,
Tirelli, Trecroci (2002). The authors use a specification in which the residual covariance matrix is a
product of a “tightness” leverage and the initial state covariance matrix that depends on LS estimations
for the states, P010
−7.
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- of 6 quarters is taken into account.31 Figures 5b and 5d additionally show a two-
dimensional perspective. Furthermore, single impulse responses of relevant periods
are compared in figure 6. In the following we distinguish between short-term reactions
that account for one and half year (quarter 0 to 5), medium-term reactions that can be
found between quarter 6 to 11 (up to year three after the shock) and long-term reactions
from quarter 12 to 20 (year three to year five).
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Figure 5: Median impulse responses of the TVP SVAR
Reaction of the output gap: The reaction pattern of the output gap is generally in line
with the findings from the linear benchmark model in section 3 (see figures 2 and 6).
Nevertheless, the implemented time-variation provides some useful additional infor-
mation. With respect to the evolvement of the dynamic reaction of the output gap to
shocks in economic activity, the following three stylized facts are important:
• The short-term “overshooting” of the output gap – following the contemporane-
31Temperature plots are presented in appendix B.
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ous quarter – increases substantially at the beginning of the sample from 1.23 in
1971Q4 to 1.33 pp in 1974Q4, then decreases only slightly to 1.30 pp in the fol-
lowing periods and remains on this level for the rest of the sample until 2008Q4.
• The reduction of the positive output gaps in the quarters following the “over-
shooting” becomes slower and less strong over the sample horizon. The min-
imum reaction moderates until it is no longer significantly different from zero
around the end of the 1990s. Furthermore the minimum reaction is slowly shifted
backwards. In 1971Q4, for example, the negative effect reaches a minimum of
close to -0.77 pp already in the fifth quarter after the shock while in 2008Q4 the
minimum is not reached before the ninth quarter and stands only at -0.16 pp
(which is no longer significantly different from zero).32
• The long-term reaction fades out to zero and is very similar throughout the whole
sample.
Reaction of the fiscal stance: The contemporaneous reaction of the fiscal stance - which
is likely to reflect the isolated working of automatic stabilizers as discretionary fiscal
policy is hardly able to react to economic shocks within the same quarter - is coun-
tercyclical (i.e. positive) and equals 0.22 percentage points. This is the same value as
in the time-invariant model, which results from the rather conservative choice for the
degree of time variation (measurement covariance matrix close to LS case). Thereafter,
the development differs substantially from the benchmark model (see also figures 2
and 6). The following three stylized facts are most important:
• The strongest short-term reaction of the fiscal stance is observed in the first and
the second quarter after the shock. In particular, the reaction in the second quar-
ter after the shock increases strongly throughout the first decade of the sample
(from 0.51 in 1971Q4 to 0.96 pp in 1979Q4). Thereafter it decreases gradually to
0.65 pp in 2008Q4.
• The deterioration of the fiscal stance reaction in the medium term slows down
over time but is related to lower minimum levels that are shifted backwards.
At the beginning of the sample (1971Q4) the minimum equals -0.29 pp and is
reached in the fifth quarter, while at the end (2008Q4) the minimum is reached at
-0.46 pp in quarter 9.
• In the long term the reactions fade out. For the earlier part of the sample the
reaction converges to zero from positive values, while the later part of the sample
shows a gradual increase from the negative minima.
Figure 6 summarizes the developments in the cyclicality and sensitivity of fiscal pol-
icy by showing four median impulse response functions related to the three regimes
identified.
32Significance is analyzed based on the 95% confidence intervals of the single impulse responses of
this period.
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Figure 6: Single median impulse responses at four different periods
Identification of fiscal policy regimes: According to the applied dynamic conception
of cyclicality (see section 2), the relation between the reactions of the output gap (state
of the business cycle) and the fiscal stance to shocks in economic activity are now eval-
uated. In addition to the direction of the reactions (positive or negative), the time-
varying framework provides us a second dimension to distinguish between regimes:
The sensitivity of the reaction. This sensitivity evolves gradually over time and thereby
delivers important additional information on the pattern of cyclicality. We are now not
only able to distinguish between a counter- or procyclical reaction, but we can also
assess whether this reaction is increasingly or decreasingly countercyclical. Hence,
regime changes may appear as well based on changes in the size of the fiscal reaction.
Bringing together the general development of fiscal balance and output gap (see
figure 5), we can distinguish three different regimes over the sample: the first from
1971 to 1979, the second from 1980 to 1998 and the third from 1999 to 2008. Figure 7
presents an illustration inwhich strong countercyclicality ismarked in green, moderate
countercyclicality in yellow and acyclical fiscal policy is marked in red.
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Figure 7: Cyclicality regimes in Germany from 1971:4 to 2008:4
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1. 1971–1979: Increasing countercyclical short- and medium-term fiscal reactions
At the beginning of the first regime in 1971, the fiscal balance follows the strong ex-
pansion of the output gap after the shock in economic activity and then decreases in a
similar pattern as the output gap. However, there is some indication for a time lag of
one quarter between the output gap and the fiscal stance reaction: the fiscal stance re-
mains (in contrast to the output gap) on a high level even two quarters after the shock
and while the effect on the output gap turns negative in quarter 3 after the shock, the
fiscal stance stays positive until quarter 4. This pattern continues as the effect on the
output gap reaches its minimum in quarter 5, while the minimum of the fiscal stance
reaction can be observed in quarter 6. From quarter 8 on, both effects are positive and
then slowly converge to zero. Taken together, the close co-movement of the output gap
and the fiscal stance reaction (with a time lag of one quarter) reflect a strong counter-
cyclical fiscal policy throughout the short and the medium term.
Moving on from 1971 to 1979 we find that the short-term output gap reaction in the
first quarter after the shock has increased.33 This does also hold for the second quarter
after the shock where the reaction nearly reaches the level of the first quarter. The
periods when the reactions turn negative and reach their minimum are both postponed
two quarters, from quarter 3 to 5 and from 5 to 7. In general, the fiscal stance reaction
follows this postponement and turns now negative in the 6th quarter and reaches its
minimum in the 8th quarter. Therefore, the general countercyclical pattern (including
the time lag of one quarter) remains valid.
However, the relative scale of the countercyclical reaction increases strongly be-
cause the fiscal stance expands disproportionally strongly compared to the output gap:
In the second quarter, for example, the fiscal balance reaction increases even from 0.51
pp in 1971Q4 to 0.96 pp in 1979Q4 (+0.45 pp), while the output gap reaction increased
only from 1.23 to 1.30 pp (+0.07 pp) in the first quarter. If we take into account that the
increase in the second quarter of the output gap reaction is stronger than in the first
quarter (from 0.73 to 1.24 pp), the fiscal stance reaction in the third quarter, applying
the one-period time lag, increases much stronger (from 0.26 to 0.89 pp). With respect
to the medium term, the minimum of the fiscal stance reaction decreased from -0.29
pp in 1971Q4 to -0.47 pp in 1979Q4 (-0.18 pp), while the minimum of the output gap
reaction even increased from -0.77 in 1971Q4 to -0.49 pp in 1979Q4 (+0.28 pp).
Overall, these findings indicate a large gradual increase of countercyclical reactions
in the first regime based on the over-proportionally strong expansion of the fiscal bal-
ance when compared to the output gap reaction in the short and medium term.
2. 1980–1998: Decreasing short-term and increasing medium-term countercyclical
fiscal reactions
The second regime starts in 1980 and lasts for roughly twice as long as the first regime.
The general reaction patterns of the output gap and the fiscal balance are unchanged
33More precisely, it increases only until 1974 (to 1.33). Then it decreases slightly to 1.30 and remains
on this level
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– sustaining a countercyclical fiscal policy reaction throughout this regime. One in-
teresting observation is that the time lag between the output gap and the fiscal bal-
ance reaction nearly vanishes regarding the medium term. At the end of this regime
(1998Q4) the output gap and the fiscal stance turn negative and reach their minimum
in the same quarter (quarter 9 after the shock).
Moving from 1980 to 1998, the short-term output gap reaction does not change
substantially in the first two quarters after the shock. Thereafter it decreases somewhat
slower than before. In 1998Q4 the output gap reaction turns negative in quarter 7 after
the shock and reaches its minimum in quarter 9 (again a postponement by two quarters
as during the first regime). Furthermore the minimum negative reaction becomes less
pronounced and significant. In 1998Q4 theminimum lies only at -0.20 pp (after -0.49 pp
in 1979Q4 and -0.77 pp in 1971Q4) and is almost insignificant. With respect to the fiscal
stance, the short-term reaction is reduced (particularly in the second and third quarter
after the shock), while the negative medium term reaction remains nearly unchanged.
Combining the development of the fiscal balance and the output gap, this implies
a gradual decrease of countercyclicality of in the short term (stable output gap reac-
tion but decreasing fiscal policy reaction) but an increasing countercyclicality in the
medium term (decreasing output gap reaction but stable fiscal policy reaction).
3. 1999–2008: Largely acyclical medium-term fiscal reactions
The third regime starts in 1999 and is of similar length as the first regime. The general
short-term reaction patterns of the output gap and the fiscal balance are nearly un-
changed. The short-term reaction remains countercyclical. However, in the medium
term the negative output gap reaction is no longer significantly different from zero,
while the fiscal balance reaction remains almost unchanged. Therefore, the medium-
term reaction becomes acyclical, because the fiscal balance reaction is negative while
the output gap is neutral.
The strength of the countercyclical reaction is gradually decreasing in the short
term, as the output gap reaction is almost constant, but the fiscal stance reaction is
somewhat moderated. As above the medium term output gap reaction fades out and
the fiscal balance reaction remains unchanged, i.e. the fiscal balance does not follow
the moderation of the output gap reaction and therefore becomes acyclical.
Summary: Taken together, we find that the countercyclicality of the fiscal stance reac-
tion to output gap shocks first increases and then decreases gradually over the sample
horizon leading to three distinct regimes. In the first regime the fiscal stance reaction to
output gap shocks increases over-proportionally strongly and pushes up countercycli-
cality in the short and in the medium term. Thereafter the fiscal policy reaction mod-
erates over-proportionally strongly in the short term, leading to a gradual decrease
in countercyclicality, while the countercyclicality in the medium term even increases
(as the medium-term output gap reaction moderates over-proportionally strongly). Fi-
nally, in the third regime from 1999 onwards, countercyclicality decreases in the short
term. In the medium term the over-proportionally strong moderation of the output
gap makes the fiscal balance reaction acyclical.
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5 Economic driving forces of fiscal policy responsiveness
In section 4 we have shown that the responsiveness of fiscal policy to shocks in eco-
nomic activity has changed over the sample horizon. What economic forces have
caused this change? In this part we use linear regression techniques to analyze the
influence of possible driving forces on the long-run changes in the responsiveness of
the German fiscal balance to the business cycle.34
Our focus is on the long-run determinants as the change in the fiscal stance reac-
tions occurs gradually and over the long run. Accordingly, the empirical evaluation is
based on a cointegration approach for the sample horizon from 1974Q1 to 2008Q4.35
An analysis of the fiscal balance sensitivity by investigating the median impulse
responses at each quarter after the shock would obviously go beyond the scope of this
study. Instead, we select the most salient median responses, half a year after the shock
for the analysis of changes in the short-run sensitivity and, the responses two years
after the shock to analyze changes in the medium-term sensitivity.36
5.1 Economic driving forces
The sensitivity of the fiscal policy reaction to output gap shocks can generally be in-
fluenced by changes in the working of automatic stabilizers and by changes in dis-
cretionary fiscal policy. What are economic factors that drive changes in these two
channels in the long run? The public finance literature shows that automatic stabiliz-
ers work especially via the effect of output gap shocks on tax revenues, and, on the
expenditure side, via changes in employment (see e.g. van den Noord, 2000). In ad-
dition there are several broader economic hypotheses on the responsiveness of fiscal
policy. Leading hypotheses concern trade openness, the impact of inflation targeting
and the degree of fiscal centralization.
Tax progressivity. One important channel for automatic stabilization is income
taxation (see e.g. Dolls et al., 2015). Here, progressive taxes play an important role, be-
cause economic up- and downturns affect the revenues of the progressive taxes over-
proportionally strongly. “A progressive income tax with high marginal tax rates could
substantially reduce fluctuations in after-tax income and, so the argument goes, pri-
vate spending, without the need for any explicit policy changes” (see Auerbach and
Feenberg, 2000, p. 37). Thus, a change in the fiscal balance reaction could be expected,
if the progressiveness of the income tax increases.
Employment. A second important channel for automatic stabilization are changes
in the employment situation of a country. A negative shock in economic activity can
lead to a loss in employment and a rise in unemployment – which activates the au-
34See e.g. Kirchner et al. (2010) for a related approach.
35The measure for fiscal centralization is only available from 1974Q1 on. Starting in 1974 seems to be
reasonable, also because the heavy fluctuations at the beginning of the 1970s are excluded.
36More precisely, medium-term sensitivity refers to the impulse response function at horizon eight
multiplied by minus one due to its original upward trend. This keeps the sensitivity measure consistent
as negative but increasing measures indicate decreasing sensitivity.
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tomatic stabilizers via unemployment compensation (see, for the general mechanism,
Dolls, Fuest, and Peichl, 2012). A long-term increase in the employment ratio could,
for example, reduce public finances’ sensitivity, because the share of those affected by
negative economic shocks (e.g. by losing their jobs) as part of the overall number of
those financing the unemployment insurance decreases, and the resulting deficits of
the unemployment insurance could be relatively smaller (or additional spending is
covered by reserves facilitated by increased employment). We therefore propose the
employment level as possible driving force for fiscal policy sensitivity.
Trade openness. The view that globalization has effects on the welfare state in
highly developed countries of the western hemisphere is widely shared in the eco-
nomic literature. However, there is a fierce ongoing debate on the direction of the
influence on public finances. According to Alesina and Perotti (1997), an increasing
degree of trade openness may reduce the responsiveness of fiscal policy to fluctua-
tions in economic activity. International competition decreases the room for taxation
and welfare state spending, and, therefore, reduces c.p. the importance of automatic
stabilization (efficiency hypothesis). In contrast, Rodrik (1997) argues that increasing
market integration leads to a more important role for governments in smoothing the
effects of negative economic shocks on their population which would be related to a
more sensitive fiscal balance in the long run (compensation hypothesis).37
Inflation targeting. A stronger targeting of stable inflation rates, historically rep-
resented by decreasing inflation rates, may reduce the responsiveness of fiscal policy
to fluctuations in economic activity through the closing debt-monetarization channel.
As governments can expect stronger inflation targeting by independent central banks,
the channel for the monetarization of fiscal deficits closes down and consolidation is-
sues, particularly in indebted economies, become the key focus. In addition, effects
on the sensitivity of fiscal policies could result from “bracket creep”, i.e. from higher
inflation that pushes nominal income into higher tax brackets. This would result in an
increase of the fiscal policy reaction (via tax revenues) to economic shocks in regimes
with increasing inflation.
Fiscal centralization. Changes in the degree of German fiscal federalism could also
influence the sensitivity of public finances in the long run. Oates (1997) argues that
local governments are more capable to tailor efficient fiscal policy reactions to locally
differing economic shocks. A lower degree of fiscal centralization could therefore be
related to a lower overall responsiveness of fiscal policy. Along the same line Blankart
(2007) stresses that local competition between smaller jurisdictions limits the room for
public spending and thereby for overly strong reactions of public finances. In contrast,
Worthington and Dollery (1999) argue that the absence of responsibility on the local
level in a system of fiscal equalization mechanisms (as the German one) might lead to
stronger spending reactions to economic shocks (also known as the “fly-paper effect”).
37Wood (1994) provides hypothesis related to the Heckscher-Ohlin model of international trade. In-
creasing trade may generate an increasing degree of income inequality in highly developed countries,
while decreasing the inequality in developing countries. Governments may therefore increase public
activity.
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5.2 Data
Figure 8 presents our short- and medium-term fiscal sensitivity measures (the fiscal
responses half a year and and two years after a shock in economic activity) and the
measures related to the possible driving forces.To evaluate the impact of tax progres-
sivity, we rely on the ratio of the indices for average gross and net wages and salaries,
which results largely from the wage and income tax.The employment ratio is measured
by the total number of employed persons over the resident population. We measure
trade openness by the total trade volume (exports plus imports) over GDP. Based on
its importance for monetary policy decisions in Germany and Europe, the annual rate
of change in the index of consumer prices (CPI) is an appropriate indicator to mea-
sure the degree of inflation targeting from an ex-post perspective. Our proxy for fiscal
centralization in Germany is the ratio of federal to local (states and municipalities) ex-
penditures.38 To control for general economic development we include real GDP per
capita (logaritmized). A level shift dummy is used to control for German reunification
in 1991. All variables are seasonally adjusted.
5.3 Stationarity and cointegration
In a first step stationarity of the variables is analyzed. Results of unit root tests (ADF)
are presented in appendix C. On a five percent level, there is statistical evidence that
the short- and medium-term sensitivity, the measure for the degree of tax system pro-
gressivity, the employment ratio, the openness variable, the inflation variable and eco-
nomic development are all driven by unit roots (some of the variables additionally
include a deterministic linear trend) and that they are stationary in first differences,
I (1). Fiscal centralization measure seems to be stationary in levels and thus it cannot
really have a long-run impact on the fiscal responsiveness. It is therefore excluded from
the “core set” of economic driving forces. Nevertheless, it is a useful control variable.
To test for long-run relations between our core set of driving forces (in different
versions) and the sensitivity of public finances cointegration is evaluated based on two
residual-based approaches, the Phillips-Ouliaris (PO) and the Engle-Granger (EG) test.
With respect to the short-term sensitivity, there is statistical evidence for a robust
long-run relation between the responsiveness of fiscal policy, employment, trade open-
ness and the inflation variable.39 If “tax progressivity” is included in the regressions,
this leads to acception of the null in each procedure. However, as tax progressivity is
found insignificant in each long-run regression, we will only refer to versions exclud-
ing it.
In contrast, the medium-term responsiveness (reaction two years after the shock)
does not include so much economic long-run information. There is statistical evidence
38We rely on spending instead on revenues, as the room for political decisions at the local and regional
levels in Germany is substantially larger with respect to expenditures than to revenues.
39For the baseline model and the weaker 10 percent level, both tests reject the null of no cointegration.
Using five percent only the PO test rejects. This evidence becomes weaker if the control variables are
additionally included (only the PO test rejects the null of no cointegration).
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Figure 8: Fiscal responsiveness and driving forces, 1974:1 - 2008:4
for a robust long-run relation between the sensitivity of fiscal policy and trade open-
ness. This evidence remains valid if we additionally control for the employment over
population ratio and the inflation rate. Here, only the inflation rate is significant, but
becomes insignificant whenever the degree of employment is excluded from the esti-
mation. The results do not depend so much on the inclusion of the again insignificant
tax progressivity. In general, the inclusion of insignificant variables strengthens the
null of no cointegration.
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5.4 Estimation results
Based on these cointegration findings our linear regression set-up includes at most the
full set of k = 6 regressors captured in the (1× k) vector Xt and loaded by the (k × 1)
vector of the cointegrating coeffients into the equation for each period t. The model
additionally employs an intercept and a level shift dummy in 1991Q1 due to the effects
from German reunification. All deterministic terms are captured in Dirt . According to
the Dynamic OLS (DOLS) approach, r leads and q lags of the cointegrating regressors
in first differences are included to eliminate the feedback between the variables and to
generate asymptotically efficient estimates. The following model is estimated,
irht = X
′
tβ
ir
i + D
ir
t γ +
r
∑
j=−q
∆X′t+jδ + ut. (3)
Short-term responsiveness: The estimation results (see appendix C) indicate that the
development of the employment ratio had the largest impact on the development of
the short-run sensitivity, followed by the degree of openness and the inflation rate.
A one percentage point (pp) increase in the employment ratio significantly de-
creases the short-term sensitivity by 0.026 to 0.028 pp in the long run. As the em-
ployment ratio increased by almost seven percentage points over our sample, it has
contributed the largest part, 0.18 to 0.20 pp. (between one-half and two-thirds), to
explaining the total decline (0.31 pp) in the short-term sensitivity.
The degree of trade openness has a significant negative impact on the short-term
responsiveness of the fiscal balance. Based on the regression specification that does not
consider any insignificant core variables or controls, (see eq. (1b) and (3b) in appendix
C), a one percentage point increase in openness leads to a decline in the sensitivity of
between 0.001 and 0.002 pp. This supports the efficiency hypothesis and contradicts
the compensation hypothesis. Given an increase in trade openness of around 50 pp
between 1974 and 2008, changes in openness explain a decrease of around 0.05 to 0.10
pp in the total decline of the sensitivity of 0.31 pp (up to one third).
A stronger inflation targeting has a significant positive impact on the short-term
sensitivity of the fiscal balance. A one percentage point increase in the inflation rate is
related to an increase in the sensitivity measure of between 0.013 and 0.016 pp. This
supports the hypotheses of a closed down debt-monetization channel or bracket creep-
ing. Based on the moderating trend of inflation over our sample (from 7 percent at
maximum to around 2 percent) price developments explain between rd. 0.07 pp points
of the short-term sensitivity development.
The impact of fiscal centralization is significant and positive, but very small (0.005
pp). As this measure is stationary, it has no real long-run effect. German reunification
in 1991 is found to decrease the sensitivity significantly, whereas tax progressivity and
general economic development do not have significant long-run impacts on short-term
fiscal policy responsiveness.
Medium-term responsiveness: For the – admittedly much smaller - decline in the
medium-term sensitivity (two years after the shock) the development of trade open-
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ness seems to be particularly decisive. The efficiency hypothesis is also supported w.r.t.
the medium-term reaction. A one percentage point increase in trade openness causes
a significant decline of, on average, 0.001 pp in the medium-term fiscal responsive-
ness in all regressions.40 The total 50 pp increase in openness contributes substantially
with 0.05 pp to the rather small overall medium-term sensitivity decline of around 0.06
percentage points (more than 3/4 of the change).
In the augmented regressions only inflation targeting seems to have a significant
long-run impact on sensitivity. However, this channel is significant only if we simulta-
neously control for the employment variable, which is insignificant with respect to the
medium-term sensitivity. Therefore, these results have to be regarded with some cau-
tion.41The employment ratio and the degree of tax progressivity, as well as the controls
for economic development and fiscal centralization do not have significant impacts
on the medium-term responsiveness of German fiscal policy. The impact of German
reunification negative, but insigficant in many specifications.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we provide empirical evidence on the timing and the responsiveness of
fiscal policy over the business cycle in Germany. Based on time-varying parameter
models for quarterly data from 1970 to 2008 we are able to derive new insights on the
short-, medium- and long-term cyclicality and on the responsiveness of fiscal policy,
while taking into account changing reaction patterns.Moreover, we empirically study
the economic driving forces behind the observed gradual evolvements in the reaction
scheme of the fiscal stance.
When combining the output gap and the fiscal balance reactions on unanticipated
economic activity shocks to analyze cyclicality, we find three distinct fiscal regimes:
1971–1979, 1980–1998 and 1999–2008. The first regime is characterized by increasingly
countercyclical short-term reactions of fiscal policy. The second regime shows counter-
cyclical short-term reactions, which are gradually decreasing in the short and gradu-
ally increasing in the medium term. The third regime is characterized by a decreasing
countercyclicality in the short and an acyclical fiscal reaction in the medium term.
Using a dynamic time series framework enables us, to further distinguishing be-
tween the short-, medium- and long-term responsiveness of fiscal policy. We find that
the short-term sensitivity of the fiscal balance (response half a year after a shock in
economic activity) decreases from around 0.96 pp at the end of the 1970s to 0.65 pp at
the end of the sample - a decline of nearly one third. The medium-term sensitivity (re-
sponse two years after a shock) is substantially lower and decreases less pronounced -
from around 0.50 pp to 0.44 pp over the sample horizon.
40Except in model (3d), which is obviously misspecified including only openness and the stationary
centralization variable.
41In the specification without any other insignificant core variable or control than employment (see
eq. (1b) in table D.2b), the impact of inflation targeting is estimated at 0.004 pp only significant at the 10
percent level. In this case, the overall moderation inflation would accounts for around 0.02 percentage
points in the sensitivity decline.
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What drives this time variation in the German fiscal policy reaction? We test several
economic hypotheses related to the working of automatic stabilizers and to economic
developments like increasing trade openness, inflation or fiscal centralization based on
a cointegration approach.
We find that the time variation in the short-term sensitivity of fiscal policy is largely
driven by developments in the employment ratio. There is statistical evidence for the
general hypothesis that larger employment ratios come along with a lower reaction of
public spending following shocks in economic activity - possibly because deficits of the
unemployment insurance become less important relatively to the contributions paid.
In addition, we find evidence for the efficiency hypothesis. According to this hypothe-
sis an increasing degree of trade openness reduces the room for fiscal policy reactions
due to an increasing competition between governments in the allocation of tax rev-
enues. A small but significant impact stems as well from the inflation rate, with the
observed decrease in the inflation rate leading to a less sensitive fiscal policy reaction.
This could support the hypothesis that lower inflation restricts fiscal policy reactions
to economic shocks by reducing the room for debt-monetization or by reducing the
importance of bracket-creeping (cold progression).
Concerning the medium-term sensitivity of fiscal policy in Germany, we find that
the trade openness channel plays by far the most important role. The increase in trade
openness explains around 75 percent of the decline in the fiscal responsiveness. Once
more, this supports the efficieny hypothesis.
Looking ahead, the study opens interesting avenues for future research. Fruitful
issues would be to investigate the timing and responsiveness of the fiscal stance on
a more disaggregated level, for example, with a focus on different tax revenue cat-
egories or expenditure items. Such analyses could derive additional information on
the transmission mechanism of shocks in economic activity to public finances. Trans-
ferring our approach to other countries (EMU and non-EMU members) could help to
compare changes between countries and analyze how the countercyclicality of the fis-
cal stance reaction differs across countries and, for example, whether it has diverged
or converged before and after EMU.
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A Results of comprehensive estimation approach
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Figure A.1: Median impulse responses of the TVP SVAR (3D) (comprehensive)
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Figure B.1: Median impulse responses of the TVP SVAR (temperature plots)
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C Driving forces: Time series properties and estimation
results
Sample
Deterministic
Driving forces ADF-statistic c lag ADF-statistic c tr lag
Short-term sensitivity -0.35 3 -3.34 * *** *** 3
Mid-term sensitivity -2.43 ** 4 -3.07 *** ** 4
Trade openness 0.83 0 -0.24 0
Employment -1.21 2 -3.07 *** *** 2
Inflation targeting -2.65 * * 4 -2.92 ** 4
Tax progressivity -1.69 * 1 -2.59 *** ** 1
Economic development -1.36 ** 0 -1.49 * 0
Fiscal centralization -4.21 *** 1 -4.10 *** *** 1
Deterministic
Driving forces ADF-statistic none lag ADF-statistic c lag
Short-term sensitivity -5.82 *** 2 -6.19 *** ** 2
Mid-term sensitivity -12.95 *** 3 -12.92 *** 3
Trade openness -5.98 *** 1 -9.56 *** ** 0
Employment -3.21 *** 1 -3.38 ** 1
Inflation targeting -6.29 *** 3 -6.37 *** 3
Tax progressivity -8.49 *** 0 -8.69 *** 0
Economic development -9.28 *** 0 -10.84 *** *** 0
Fiscal centralization -15.69 *** 0 -15.67 *** 0
a
b
c
d
Table D.1: Augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF) tests on unit roots 
a, b, c, d
Lag length by Schwarz Information Criterion (SIC), max =13. 
Null hypothesis of a unit  root . *, **, *** indicates rejection at the 10%, 5%, 1% level. 
The terms c and tr represent a constant and a linear trend. Here, *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, 1%
level of significance. 
Short-term sensit ivity refers to the impule response function at forecast horizon two. Mid-term sensitivity refers to the
impulse response function at horizon eight , multiplied by minus 1 due to its original upward trend, to keep the sensitivity
measure consistent .
1974Q1 - 2008Q4
Level 
First differences
Constant and trendConstant
None Constant
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Driving forces
Tax progressivity -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001
Employment -0.025 *** -0.026 *** -0.028 *** -0.029 *** -0.027 *** -0.028 *** -0.026 ***
Trade openness -0.001 *** -0.001 *** -0.002 *** -0.002 *** -0.002 *** -0.002 *** -0.002 ***
Inflation targeting 0.013 *** 0.013 *** 0.014 *** 0.015 *** 0.015 *** 0.016 *** 0.014 ***
Controls
Economic development 0.107 0.112 0.032
Fiscal centralization
e
0.005 *** 0.005 *** 0.004 ***
Deterministic
Constant 2.152 *** 2.074 *** 2.068 *** 2.029 *** 1.915 *** 1.818 *** 1.925 ***
Reunification -0.053 *** -0.056 *** -0.088 *** -0.090 ** -0.040 *** -0.042 *** -0.056 **
Stats and Diagnostics
Observations
Adjusted R²
Durbin-Watson statistic
Cointegration tests stat p stat p stat p stat p stat p stat p stat p
Phillips-Oularis
tau -5.217 0.008 -4.923 0.007 -5.784 0.004 -5.813 0.001 -5.234 0.018 -4.992 0.015 -5.797 0.009
z -34.511 0.052 -34.244 0.022 -34.745 0.104 -34.892 0.049 -34.629 0.106 -35.001 0.048 -34.771 0.185
Engle-Granger
tau -5.055 0.012 -4.681 0.014 -5.852 0.003 -5.882 0.001 -5.080 0.027 -4.784 0.026 -5.861 0.007
z -27.808 0.159 -28.055 0.073 -29.148 0.232 -29.474 0.123 -28.281 0.259 -29.574 0.121 -29.454 0.349
a 
b
c
d
e
Table D.2a: Driving forces of short-term  fiscal policy sensitivity (Sample: 1974Q1 - 2008Q4) 
a, b, c, d
Short-term sensitivity
(1a) (1b) (2a) (2b) (3a) (3b) (4)
(0.000)
(0.004) (0.002) (0.006) (0.008) (0.003) (0.003) (0.006)
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
(0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001)
(0.003)
(0.147) (0.164) (0.116)
(0.243)
(0.010) (0.006) (0.031) (0.037) (0.009) (0.007) (0.024)
(0.228) (0.108) (0.267) (0.153) (0.178) (0.102)
131
0.98 0.98 0.98 0.98 0.98 0.98 0.99
131 131 131 131 131 131
Fiscal centralization is a stat ionary variable.
0.73 0.57 0.85 0.62 0.99 0.83 1.03
Dependent variables are median impulse responses from the identified TVP-VAR half a year after the shock, measured in percentage points. Explanatory variables are measured in
percent. 
Cointegration equations are estimated by Dynamic OLS (DOLS) with four leads and four lags (due to the quarterly frequency) of the differenced regressors to generate asymptotically
efficient est imates and eliminate the endogeneity (long-run correlat ion) of the regressors. T his shortens the available sample, 1974Q1 - 2008Q4, to an adjusted sample, 1975Q2 -
2007Q4. Estimates for the related nuisance parameters are not shown. To generate reliable long-run coefficient covariances (and the related standard deviations) we used the Newey-
West covariance matrix est imator with non-prewhitened Bartlett  kernel and a Newey-West fixed bandwidth of 5.000. Moreover, the long-run variance est imate is degree-of-freedom 
Standard deviations are reported in parentheses. Asterisks *,**,*** indicate significance at  the 10%, 5%, 1% level.
We refer single equation residual-based cointegration tests, the Phillips-Oularis and the Engle-Granger test. These tests differ in their method of accounting for serial correlat ion in
the cointegration residuals. The first test uses the non-parametric approach based on Phillips-Perron (estimtating the long-run variance using a Bartlett kernel and a Newey-West
fixed bandwidth of 5.00). The second test refers to a parametric augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) approach which is also used in the stat ionarity analyses (lag choice using Schwarz
Information Criterion with max 12). Both tests have the null hypothesis that  series are not cointegrated. Italic numbers indicate no cointegration even at the stronger 5% level.  
(0.002)(0.002) (0.002) (0.001)
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Driving forces
Tax progressivity 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.001
Employment 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.000
Trade openness -0.001 *** -0.001 *** -0.001 *** -0.001 *** -0.001 *** -0.001 *** -0.001 *** -0.001 *** -0.001 ** -0.001 *** -0.001 *** -0.001 -0.001 **
Inflation targeting 0.004 * 0.004 * 0.001 0.004 * 0.004 ** 0.002 0.003 0.003 * 0.000 0.003
Controls
Economic development 0.014 0.035 0.035 0.023 0.079
Fiscal centralization
e
-0.001 -0.001 -0.002 -0.003 ** -0.002
Deterministic
Constant 0.443 ** 0.478 *** 0.520 *** 0.520 *** 0.415 0.415 ** 0.466 *** 0.491 *** 0.516 ** 0.529 *** 0.627 *** 0.686 *** 0.601 *
Reunification -0.003 -0.002 -0.012 *** -0.012 *** -0.008 -0.016 -0.022 -0.020 * -0.005 -0.005 -0.016 *** -0.017 *** -0.026
Stats and Diagnostics
Observations
Adjusted R²
Durbin-Watson statistic
Cointegration tests stat p stat p stat p stat p stat p stat p stat p stat p stat p stat p stat p stat p stat p
Phillips-Oularis
tau -5.608 0.002 -5.575 0.001 -5.181 0.001 -5.015 0.000 -5.462 0.009 -5.380 0.005 -5.337 0.002 -5.019 0.001 -5.936 0.002 -5.773 0.001 -5.646 0.001 -5.615 0.000 -5.934 0.006
z -52.145 0.001 -51.711 0.000 -45.116 0.001 -43.088 0.000 -49.535 0.007 -48.796 0.003 -48.558 0.001 -43.432 0.001 -56.747 0.002 -54.106 0.001 -51.707 0.000 -51.586 0.000 -56.552 0.004
Engle-Granger
tau -5.564 0.003 -5.523 0.001 -5.186 0.001 -5.014 0.000 -5.444 0.010 -5.347 0.005 -5.306 0.002 -5.009 0.001 -4.500 0.105 -4.490 0.054 -4.394 0.029 -5.615 0.000 -4.516 0.178
z -51.085 0.002 -50.476 0.001 -45.236 0.001 -43.067 0.000 -49.115 0.008 -48.054 0.004 -47.878 0.001 -43.231 0.001 -40.479 0.041 -40.015 0.019 -37.647 0.011 -51.586 0.000 -40.535 0.081
a 
b
c
d
e
1.20 0.99 0.78 0.70 1.18 1.02 0.84
131
0.68 0.62 0.55 0.49 0.65 0.63 0.55
131 131 131 131 131 131
(0.000)(0.000)
(0.074)
(0.007) (0.006) (0.004) (0.004) (0.020) (0.022) (0.015)
(0.192) (0.115) (0.018) (0.015) (0.283) (0.017)
(0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
(0.105)
(1a) (1b) (1c) (1d) (2a) (2b) (2c)
Table D.2b: Driving forces of mid-term  fiscal policy sensitivity (Sample: 1974Q1 - 2008Q4) 
a, b, c, d
(0.000)
(3d)
(0.000) (0.000)
(0.002) (0.003) (0.006) (0.006)
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
(2d) (3a) (3b)
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
(0.002) (0.003)
(0.002)
(3c)
(0.001)
(0.002)
131131 131 131
0.52 0.67 0.61
(0.041) (0.249) (0.139)
(0.011) (0.014) (0.008)
(0.097)
(0.005)
(0.033)
(0.002) (0.001)
Standard deviations are reported in parentheses. Asterisks *,**,*** indicate significance at  the 10%, 5%, 1% level.
Cointegration equations are estimated by Dynamic OLS (DOLS) with four leads and four lags (due to the quarterly frequency) of the differenced regressors to generate asymptotically efficient estimates and eliminate the endogeneity (long-run correlation) of the regressors. This shortens the available sample, 1974Q1
- 2008Q4, to an adjusted sample, 1975Q2 - 2007Q4. Estimates for the related nuisance parameters are not shown. To generate reliable long-run coefficient covariances (and the related standard deviations) we used the Newey-West covariance matrix estimator with non-prewhitened Bartlett kernel and a Newey-
West fixed bandwidth of 5.000. Moreover, the long-run variance estimate is degree-of-freedom adjusted.
We refer single equation residual-based cointegration tests, the Phillips-Oularis and the Engle-Granger test . T hese tests differ in their method of accounting for serial correlation in the cointegration residuals. The first test uses the non-parametric approach based on Phillips-Perron (estimtating the long-run variance
using a Bartlett kernel and a Newey-West fixed bandwidth of 5.00). T he second test refers to a parametric augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) approach which is also used in the stationarity analyses (lag choice using Schwarz Information Criterion with max 12). Both tests have the null hypothesis that series are not
cointegrated. Italic numbers indicate no cointegration even at  the stronger 5% level.  
0.75 1.25 0.98
(0.083)
(0.003) (0.002)
(0.000)
(0.000)
(0.001) (0.001)
Fiscal centralization is a stationary variable.
0.66
1.26
Mid-term sensitivity
Dependent variables are median impulse responses from the identified TVP-VAR two years after the shock, measured in percentage points and multiplied by -1 (due to consistency with short-term sensit ivity measure). Explanatory variables are measured in percent. 
(0.099)
(0.002)
(0.323)
(0.002)
131
(4)
(0.000)
(0.010)
(0.003)
(0.023)
131
0.54 0.51
0.74 0.71
(0.001)
(0.005)
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